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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah,
Plaintiff-Appellant

Case No. 14819

vs.
RAYMOND S. SHUEY,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court of
the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County,
denying plaintiff the use of the presumption rule, i.e.,
that it may be presumed or inferred the registered owner of
a vehicle, parked in violation of a parking regulation,
was the person committing the violation.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
Upon stipulated facts the lower court•found the
defendant not guilty and denied plaintiff the use of the
presumption rule.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is the registered owner of a Porsche vehicle,
license No. KCC 789 and an Opal, license No. JJB 704.

During
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1974 and 1975 there were 14 parking tickets for meter
violations issued against these vehicles by Salt Lake City
Police Meter Maids.

All tickets were issued within the

corporate limits of Salt Lake City.

Defendant was served

with complaint, legally issued, and a set of facts were
stipulated to by the respective counsel.

The stipulated

facts were as outlined above, with the addition that
Section 156 of the Salt Lake City Traffic Code is a duly
enacted ordinance, regulating parking meter violations.
The facts were so stipulated and the case presented to the
court for the determination as to wheth.er the presumption
rule should be applied.
ARGUMENT
THERE IS A COMMON LAW PRESUMPTION RULE
THAT THE OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WAS
OPERATING IT AT THE TIME IT WAS PARKED
IN VIOLATION OF A PARKING REGULATION.
Because there is peculiar difficulties as to proof of
the person who actually parked a motor vehicle at the time
a violation occurred, courts have established a presumption
rule of evidence.

This rule is that it may be presumed or

inferred that the owner of a motor vehicle 'was operating it
at the time it was parked in violation of a parking regulation.

Parking violations are of a peculiar sort.

When

vehicles are parked and left unattended, there is generally
no one present to be arrested.

It is unreasonable to require
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a police officer to remain until the driver returns or to
have one stationed at each parking space (or even a group
of parking spaces)

to watch who parks the vehicles therein.

The only remaining alternatives are to impound vehicles
in violation or to toss out parking regulations entirely.
The impounding of vehicles is no practical solution to
the problem because a city could not keep on hand sufficient
tow trucks to tow away the vehicles in violation.

The

expense thereof would be prohibitive and it would also be
very distruptive of traffic movement, the very thing parking
regulations are designed to relieve.

One could envision

500 tow trucks in the downtown area of Salt Lake City towing
one vehicle after another to an impound lot.

Shoppers and

persons on business could not even get through the streets,
let alone find a parking spot.
The only logical and reasonable alternative is a presumption or inference.

A presumption of this type arises

from commonly accepted experienced of mankind and inferences
which reasonable men might draw from such experience.
Meares v. Meares, 256 Ala. 596, 56 So.2d 661 (1952); Indianapolis v. Keeley, 167 Ind. 516, 79 N.E. 499 (1906).

When

there is uniform experience concerning the connection
between one fact that is proved and the one to be inferred,
the unproven fact may be presumed.

Greer v. U.S., 245 U.S.
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559, 62 L.ed. 469, 38 S.Ct. 209

(1918).

If there is a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact to be presumed, the court may apply
the presumption rule, i.e., on the basis of human experience i t is the probable or natural explanation of the
fact.

Manning v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 100

u.s.

693, 25 L.ed. 761 (1880); Engel v. United Traction co.,
203 N.Y. 321, 96 N.E. 731 (1911).
In considering the cons ti tutionali ty of an inference,
the United States Supreme Court has applied a variety of
tests to evaluate such inference.

That court has determined

that there must be a rational connection between the fact
proved and the fact presumed.

Tot v. U.S., 319 U.S. 463,

467, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.ed. 1519 (1943).

The presumed

fact must be more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact.

Leary v. U.S., 395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.ed.

2d 57 (1969).
It is human experience that it is more likely than not
that the owner of a vehicle is the one who parked a vehicle
when a violation occurred.

Regarding the rational connection

between ownership and operation of a vehicle and the relative
convenience of producing evidence of the facts, the Supreme
Court of Michigan in People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.li.
248

(1938), referred to a random sampling taken on two
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different dates where it was found that in 87,6% of the
cases where vehicles had been illegally parked, the owner
of such vehicle was the one cornrnitting the violation.

In

8% of the cases the violation was cornrnitted by an immediate
member of the owner's family.

They found that in only

4.4% of the cases surveyed that the violation was cornrnitted
by some person other than the owner or an immediate member
of his family.
Presumptions can be made in criminal cases.
case of State v. Kennedy,

Iowa

In the

, 224 N.W.2d 223

(1974), the court upheld a conviction of tampering

w~th

the odometer merely by showing the defendant was the owner
of the vehicle and that the odometer was changed (no showing
that defendant tampered with the odometer).

This was a

much more serious offense than is a parking meter violation
and subjected the defendant to far greater penalties.
A substantial number of cases have concluded that an
inference of the owner's guilt was justified in parking
violations as a conunon law rule of evidence even though
there is no statute or ordinance so

provid~ng.

In People v.

Rubin, 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E.2d 501 (1940), the New York
Court of Appeals stated:
"The contrary is urged because there was no
direct proof that the stationing of the car in
violation of the ordinance was done by the defendant.
To rule that this inference may not

-5-
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be drawn from the established facts would be to
deny to the trier of the facts the right to use
a common process of reasoning . . . • If he was
not in control he could easily have produced
a witness or witnesses to show it.
(Citations
omitted) We find it competent under the circumstances to conclude from the proof that the owner
of the car controlled the car and personally
violated the regulation."
See also, People v. Lang, 106 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1951),· co

~-

wealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934); Chicago v.
Crane, 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N.E.2d 802 (1943).
The Supreme Court of Bhode Island came to the same
conclusion in the case of State v. Morgan, 72 R.I. 101,
48 A.2d 248 (1946).

Therein the court stated:

"It was agreed by the parties that the sole
issue was the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the conclusion that the defendant had
parked or allowed the automobile to be parked
in violation of law. The decisive question
therefore is whether, in the absence of any
rule of evidence appearing in the enabling
statute or municipal traffic regulations, the
mere proof of the registration of the automobile in defendant's name, without more, is
enough to support an inference that hehad
parked or allowed the automobile to be so
parked, and to sustain a conviction if such
inference is not explained or refuted by other
evidence.
"
the defendant's exception cannot
be sustained, and therefore the decision of
the superior court finding the defendant
guilty stands."
In another New York case, wherein the defendant appealed
the finding of guilty and the imposition of a $5.00 fine foc
illegal parking, the court said:
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"If this judgment is to be sustained, it is
necessary for us to hold that the proved fact
of the ownership of the automobile by the appellant
raises the presumption that the car was under
the control of the appellant, and that therefore
he is responsible for having violated the provisions of the ordinance against illegal parking.
Without this presumption no prima facie case has
been made out." People v. Marchetti, 154 Misc.
147, 276 N.Y.S. 708 (1934).
The court held the presumption rule applies.

After dis-

cussion of various applications of the presumption rule in
related areas, the court held,
"Granting that mere ownership of an automobile
is not evidence of exclusive control, still it
is well within the owners power to produce evidence as to who was or was not in control, evidence
which the people are in most cases unable to present.
"I hold, therefore, in this case, given evidence
of ownership and illegal parking, the prosecution
may rest their case upon a presumption of guilt,
making i t incumbent upon the defendant to produce
evidence that would negative this presumption.
Presumptions need not always be provided for by
statute, as conclusively appears from the cases
above cited and numerous others." Id. at p. 711.
The court, in People v. Johnson, 228 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1962),
commented on the presumption rule and said:
"Where a motor vehicle is registered in the
name of a particular owner, a presumption is
created that the owner is the person who violated
the parking ordinance, and the burden is placed
upon the owner to offer proof that he was not
in possession or control of the vehicle. This
principle does not change the law as to the
presumption of innocence, but merely shifts the
burden of going forward from the people to the
defendant."
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I
The only case which this writer found wherein
refused to apply the presumption rule in a parking

the court
violation

matter is State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 19, 72 S.E.2d 54 (

1952

While the court recognized the desirability of such a

). ,

rule,

i t declined to give rise to such a presumption in the
absence of a statute or ordinance authorizing its use.

The

court refused to apply the presumption because the prev~us
session of the state legislature had rejected a bill on such
a presumption.
CONCLUSION
Because of the peculiar nature of parking violations,
parking tickets would be useless unless the City also has
a practical means of enforcement and this is a presumption
rule of evidence inferring that the owner was the one
committing the violation.

Since the owner is the one with

the best knowledge, he can easily refute the inference if
he was not the violator.

In order to balance the rights

of the people as a whole against the individual rights, it
is not unreasonable to allow the court to use common sense
of mankind to give weight to such an inference.

The rule

does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proof,
but merely shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.
There is a common law presumption rule in effect, that is,
as Justice Crockett stated in his dissenting opinion in the
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case of Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Ut. 344, 249 P.2d 507
(1952), p. 513, "to infer that the owner parked his automobile or was responsible for doing so."
rt is urgent that this Court rule that there is a
presumption rule of evidence as herein stated and remand
this case to the District Court with such instructions.
Respectfully submitted,

0. WALLACE EARL
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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